A dupla estrutura do conhecimento: relação entre teoria e compreender prévio do ser-no-mundo em Martin Heidegger

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2009
Autor(a) principal: Seibt, Cezar Luís
Orientador(a): Stein, Ernildo Jacob
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Tese
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul
Porto Alegre
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3536
Resumo: The problem of this thesis is the knowledge. Opposed to the metaphysics of knowledge or theory of knowledge it offers the alternative of hermeneutic phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. We began by presenting some fundamental elements produced by the tradition trying to solve the problem through several explanatory theories of knowledge. We show that the metaphysical tradition starts with the separation between subject and object, presupposing these two opposed entities that enter into the cognitive relation, while the thought of Heidegger is a phenomenological description from the previous horizon, from factical soil, within which the separations and possible theories are developed. We present, therefore, the dual structure of knowledge, in which the primary element is the comprehensive being-in-theworld of Dasein and all other behaviors are derived from this one. The problem mind and world, internal and external experience, important and central themes in modern thought, appears in new light whit the contributions of Heidegger. If the separation mind and world leads to always new theories to ensure the correspondence between the object and that we say about him, the known seen from the phenomenology point of view (a phenomenology of knowledge) returns to the factical condition in which we always are, the comprehensive opening of being. At this level it is not necessary to justify or prove truth because the truth is Dasein’s mode of being. It is not, however, an overrun or elimination of the metaphysical projects, which retains its validity, but an exercise to return to the place where they constitute themselves as such, and is, therefore, a new meeting with himself and return to being-in-the-world, for behind the objectification. Knowing is a mode of being of Dasein, marked by finitude, the contingency, the temporality. There isn’t, in this case, a ground outside the relationship, because transcendence is finite, emerges by the ontological difference and moves in a hermeneutic circle, in a game of veiling and unveiling. From that can the limits and possibilities of knowledge be thought.