Estrutura de capital e competitividade de mercado

• Ano de defesa: 2019
• Autor(a) principal: Joice Garcia de Oliveira
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Brasil; DCF - DEPARTAMENTO DE CONTABILIDADE; Programa de Pós-graduação em Controladoria e Contabilidade; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Endividamento; Competição de mercado; Trade-off theory; Pecking order theory; Contabilidade; Mercado financeiro; Concorrência
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/30956

As a matter of great importance for the financial decisions of a firm, as well as the determination of its value, the capital structure subject has already been much explored in the literature. However, the capital structure is still little explored regarding the market competition in which companies are inserted, mainly in the Brazilian market. Thus, the main objective of this work was to identify the relation between the market competition of the different sectors of Brazilian economy and the capital structure of the firms. To do this, we used a sample covering Brazilian companies listed in B3 in the year 2010 to 2017. To characterize the debt, five proxies were used: total indebtedness at book values, short-term debt of book values, long-term indebtedness of book values, total indebtedness in relation to shareholders' equity and total indebtedness to market value. Market competition was measured by seven indicators: Herfindahl index, vertical integration, Herfindahl index variation, Clients' Power of Bargaining and Suppliers Bargaining Power, Dynamism and Munificence. The statistical method used was the multiple linear regression in the GMM approach, since the literature indicates the existence of endogeneity between leverage and profitability. The results indicated for the acceptance of the hypothesis H1b: there is a negative relation between the market competition of the different sectors and the indebtedness of the companies. This can be explained by the need to monitor managers, who, in case of market concentration, can use debt as a way of monitoring the firm. On the other hand, when there is high competition in the market, the industry competition itself works as a monitor for managers.