O efeito de eleição padrão e por revogação (“recall”) na distribução desigual de recursos públicos no jogo dos bens públicos
| Ano de defesa: | 2021 |
|---|---|
| Autor(a) principal: | |
| Orientador(a): |
Goyos, Antonio Celso de Noronha
 |
| Banca de defesa: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Tese |
| Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: | por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de São Carlos
Câmpus São Carlos |
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia - PPGPsi
|
| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: | |
| Área do conhecimento CNPq: | |
| Link de acesso: | https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/15246 |
Resumo: | The present study aimed to investigate whether the recall election condition would be more effective in reducing the frequency of unequally distributing resources than the standard election and whether both would increase the frequency of equal distributions, in comparison with the conditions under which punishments would not be in effect. Fifteen people of both genders and with different levels of education participated in this study. Participation consisted of playing a mobile application version of the Public Goods Game (JBP). Two different studies were programmed, with 3 conditions each. Condition 1 as well as condition 2 was the same for both studies. In condition 1, the participants played the JBP in the standard version, in which they received 10 tokens each time to contribute to the public fund. Each participant was playing with 5 other non-real participants controlled by the application's algorithms, who always contributed between 6 and 10. The amounts invested in the fund were added up and multiplied by a yield factor, and the result was divided equally among all. . In condition 2, the real participant was drawn as an administrator and in each attempt after contributing to the fund, he should decide how the income would be distributed among him to the other participants. In condition 3 in study 1, a standard (intermittent) election system was introduced in which every 5 attempts the real participant, who was an administrator, could receive votes to remain as administrator, or if not, he would be suspended for 3 attempts. In condition 3 of study 2, the election took place in all attempts (Recall), with suspension during 1 attempt. The results showed that the standard election produced greater stability in the patterns of equal distributions than the recall election, although the immediate effects of the suspension produced in condition 3 of study 2 demonstrate that the suspension controlled the distribution behavior. In addition, none of the participants showed a 100% inequal distribution pattern, as in study 1. Future studies may investigate the differential effect obtained by the different elections with regard to the magnitude of the aversive stimulus (suspension time). |