O problema da linguagem no sistema hegeliano: o paradoxo do absoluto incondicionado e exprimível

• Ano de defesa: 2007
• Autor(a) principal: Cossetin, Vânia Lisa Fischer
• Orientador(a): Luft, Eduardo
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul; Porto Alegre
• Palavras-chave em Português: FILOSOFIA ALEMÃ; HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO; FILOSOFIA DA LINGUAGEM; FENOMENOLOGIA DO ESPÍRITO - CRÍTICA E INTERPRETAÇÃO
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10923/3523

The Hegelian refuse to all Absolute, either intuited or posed without reflection, required the elaboration of a philosophical system that was intelligible and discursive all the time. The idea that comes from this is that the possibility of the intelligibility of such Absolute is parallel to the possibility of its exposition. That means, the necessity inherent to it, that needs to produce the contingent being externalized and at the same time needs to be free of it to reach its full identity with itself, proving the independence of this contingent, has in language its mediator. Language thus assumes, in Hegelian philosophy, the unmistakable role of mediator between the sensible and the intelligible, freeing the system of exterior determinations and contingents that still condition it: in Anthropology, man distinguishes from its animal being through the voice; in Psychology, through representation, especially the linguistic sign, intelligence ascents to the thought where it keeps no more dependence to the world of objects and deals only with its own determinations; and in Phenomenology, language reverts the belief of the consciousness in immediate and singularized access to the object, leading it to the Absolute Knowledge. The result of this is that in Logics the linguistic presupposition of the categories of which it parts and the finite language through which it is exposed must be overcome by the inconditionality of the pure thought. This is the duality, apparently unbeatable, between thought and language: how is it possible a thought, at the same time, absolute and expressible, if thought can only reach the absoluteness getting free of this finite language, marked by unfinishable traces of contingency? We see then a divided Hegel, in the one hand assuming a finite language as necessary to the full development and exposition of the pure thought system and, on the other hand, requiring apriorism of the pure thought, therefore having to abandomn this alleged linguistic conditionality.