Contratos de performance sob risco e na ausência de incentivo

• Ano de defesa: 2011
• Autor(a) principal: Constantino, Luiz Felipe Monteiro
• Orientador(a): Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataíde
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Contrato de remuneração; Bônus; Aversão ao risco; Utilidade reserva
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Labour contract; Bonus; Risk aversion; Outside option
• Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/10146

This paper shows that fixed wages are not the optimal solution for a labour contract when the worker’s outside option is a function of a factor that can vary. The worker’s contract will include a bonus that will also be a function of the same factor that modifies its outside option, even though this factor does not depend on his effort and the agent is risk-averse. This result contrasts with the classical theory according to which one should only allocate risk to the employee when such contract is necessary to provide incentives for greater effort from the agent. Another conclusion of this paper is that there is a limit to the risk the employee assumes in the optimal contract, i.e., the value of the bonus is an increasing function of the difference of the values of the worker’s outside options between the possible scenarios only until a certain point, after which the size of the bonus is fixed.