Governos benevolentes, governos Leviatã e a (in)eficiência da guerra fiscal

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2007
Autor(a) principal: Reich, Renata Villarta Moreira
Orientador(a): Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa da
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Link de acesso: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/7877
Resumo: The tax competition has been explored in the international fiscal literature about the citizen welfare efficiency. Many Brazilian publications distinguished the fiscal competition as inefficient and perverse, based only in the negative foundations of the tax war between governments. This work consist to explore the main concepts of tax competition literature, as externalities etc, and to understand through models how the governments performance could be responsible in the (in)efficiency results of tax war. Through the theoretical basis was possible to study the fiscal policies adopted by the government of Rio de Janeiro in the beginning of 2003 and middle of 2005. The ending of this work shows that some assumptions in tax competition can raise the efficiency and the levei of the citizen welfare, and the war tax is not always mean.