Três ensaios sobre guerra fiscal e incentivos estaduais para a industrialização

• Ano de defesa: 2011
• Autor(a) principal: Pontes, Paulo Araújo
• Orientador(a): Biderman, Ciro
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Guerra fiscal; Incentivos fiscais; Políticas de desenvolvimento
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Fiscal war; Tax incentives; Development policies
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8646

The competition for private investment, undertaken by local governments is a common phenomenon in federal countries, and the provision of fiscal incentives such as tax cuts, tools routinely used. In this sense, theoretical perspectives argue that this dispute would resemble a model of perfect competition, in which voters seek to settle them in villages that offer a basket of taxes and public services that were closer to their desires, however some authors are opposed to this view claiming that such competition would lead to a reduction in social welfare given by tax revenues resulting low. It should be noted that, in general, this conflict results from the desire to promote local economic development, thus justifying the provision of tax benefits by attracting companies that, in turn, encourage employment in the localities where they settled . Thus, in this thesis, we decided to analyze some aspects related to the War Tax in Brazil, first, an econometric exercise carried out on fiscal externalities between Brazilian states, and found evidence of tax competition when one considers the collection of ICMS as a whole and in specific sectors, notably comercial. Then in the second chapter, we assessed whether the policy of tax incentives to the industrial sector of the State of Ceará effectively contributes to the generation of jobs in the state, concluding that the positive results are limited to the shoe industry, that is, such a policy presents limited results in terms of its objectives. Finally, the third chapter, is discussed whether this would be a political pork barreling, that is, if the transfers from the state public sector to the private sector would ensure election results for the party that held the state executive from 1990 to 2006. The results suggest the existence of a positive elasticity between the tax incentives and vote in the PSDB candidate for governor.