Bank responses to corporate reorganization: evidence from Brazil

• Ano de defesa: 2017
• Autor(a) principal: Oreng, Mariana Aparecida Calabrez
• Orientador(a): Saito, Richard
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: eng
• Palavras-chave em Português: Falências; Recuperação judicial; Classes de credores; Modelo de barganha de credores
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Bankruptcy; Reorganization; Creditor class; Creditors’ bargain model
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/18057

This study analyzes how bank creditors vote on corporate reorganization filings. Brazil offers an excellent scenario for bankruptcy research: on the 10th anniversary of the Brazilian Bankruptcy Code, the number of reorganization filings skyrocketed, increasing from 110 in 2005 to 1863 in 2016. Our work is both theoretical and empirical; we suggest a cooperative game setting to explain creditor behavior, and we apply pooled cross-sectional data from 125 reorganization filings in Brazil from 2006 to 2016. We find evidence that the haircut proposed by debtors is the main factor driving bank creditors’ decisions, rather than firm size or age, as the traditional literature proposes. In accordance with our theoretical model, the proportion of senior debt is not relevant in explaining bank responses to reorganizations. By employing a unique dataset, we contribute to the bankruptcy literature by showing that the unified creditors’ framework does not apply. By looking at bank conflict at the interest level, we verify that the approval rate for reorganization filings decreases sharply, which indicates that coordination failures result from negotiation problems and often lead to liquidation. Due to legal and process similarities with countries such as the United States and Canada, the study also offers important insights regarding bankruptcy cases in general.