Habermas: a (re)construção kantiana dos Fundamentos da dignidade e dos direitos humanos

• Ano de defesa: 2019
• Autor(a) principal: Salomão, Katia Rocha
• Orientador(a): Antunes , Jadir
• Banca de defesa: Antunes, Jadir , Schütz, Rosalvo , Ciotta, Tarcilio , Zenni, Alessandro Severino Valler , Durão, Aylton Barbieri
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Estadual do Oeste do Paraná; Toledo
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Centro de Ciências Humanas e Sociais
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Dignidade humana; Direitos humanos; Direito cosmopolita; Discurso; Ideias transcendentais
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Human dignity; Human rights; Cosmopolitan law; Discourse; Transcendental ideas; Detranscendentalization.
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://tede.unioeste.br/handle/tede/4636

The thesis presented proposes the analysis of the (re)reading of the Kantian philosophical foundations of Human Dignity and Human Rights, promoted by Jürgen Habermas. The problematic presented converges to reflect on Habermas's process of (re)appropriation of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, for the construct of the concept of Human Dignity (Menschenwürde), through the adaptation of Kantian assumptions to his philosophy of law and pragmatics. of speech. This is because, according to Habermas, Dignity is the conceptual bridge that enables human rights. Thus, initially the focus is to understand the process of appropriation undertaken in the Habermasian philosophy, already present in his early writings, from which it is possible to perceive the concept of Dignity linked to the ideas of autonomy and freedom. Secondly, the concept of Human Dignity analyzed the permanence of a heuristic function capable of denouncing the negligence of Human Rights. Given this, Cosmopolitan Law is reread in terms of Transnational Law with the perspective of sustaining the task of safeguarding Human Rights, without falling into an idealistic plan, even with moral overload. Finally, it compared how far Habermas is with Kant and beyond Kant, by proposing to rethink the foundations of the link between Human Dignity and Human Rights, in terms of discursive institutionalization and (de) transcendentalization of arguments. This is because, for Habermas, Morality is universally constructed in discursive understanding, guided by the principle of discourse (PU) in mutual understanding (Verständigung). On the contrary, in Kant, the construction of Morality depends on an internal process of the subject turned to a transcendental a priori of reason and, consequently, it is in his philosophy to affirm the Dignity associated with Morality inherent to the cognoscent subject. By these aspects, it is suspected that the Habermasian foundation, even partially, resides in the transcendental content of universal Morality, which, for him, guides the understanding. Therefore, Human Dignity, supported by solidarity between strangers, recognition of the other, legal processes and the attainment of human rights, is still a path towards combating that hostile and vile nature, which resides in the dynamics of life, in which the rationality of the system prevails. Habermas himself has this awareness. Equally, he is aware that he has reformulated Kant to some extent, however, that much of his thinking is in the ideas of peace and dignity of the köningsberg philosopher.