Crédito e seguro rurais: regra ao invés de discrição

• Ano de defesa: 2015
• Autor(a) principal: Afonso, Renato Jose [UNIFESP]
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP)
• Palavras-chave em Português: rural insurance; agricultural credit; rules; discretion; rational expectation; seguro rural; crédito agropecuário; regras; discrição; expectativa racional
• Link de acesso: https://sucupira.capes.gov.br/sucupira/public/consultas/coleta/trabalhoConclusao/viewTrabalhoConclusao.jsf?popup=true&id_trabalho=3302742; https://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/47737

Credit operations for agricultural financing in case of bad harvest are analyzed. It is shown that rural finance debts are not charged when a bad harvest happens. It is argued that extensions of loans are harmful to the system because they decrease the amount of resources available for new contracts. The objective of this study is to corroborate a proposal for joint recruitment and binding of Credit and Rural Insurance, the Safe Credit. This argument is based on the literature of rules rather than discretion in management. Our policy includes clauses such as progressive discount, franchise and green. A mapping of micro-regional climate risk is indicated as a solution to set aliquots. This will allow improvements to agriculture, higher funding and more insurance.