Sentido e compreensão em Ser e Tempo

• Ano de defesa: 2009
• Autor(a) principal: Nascimento, Thiago Carreira Alves
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; BR; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Palavras-chave em Português: Sentido; Compreensão; Interpretação; Relação; Remissão; Signo; Sense; Comprehension; Interpretation; Relation; Remission; Sign; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9057

The main aim of this dissertation is to analyse the concept of sense in Being and Time, in the context of comprehension. From an initial characterization of the notion of sense presented by Heidegger, we make explicit the conceptual net in which this concept is caught, proceeding by an explanation of it. Locating the central point of this conceptual net in the context of comprehension and interpretation, we proceed by an analysis of such notions, but confining ourselves to the context of explanation of the comprehension of entities, as a matter of our copying with the things in the world and by means of a fore-predicative and predicative structure. In this sense, we present an approach which points out the notion of relation as a central issue, presenting in this sense a sort of typology of relations in Being and Time, and showing the importance of this notion regarding the explanation of the senses of being. We pay special attention to the notion of sign, for it means a exemplar type of relation, named by remission, which is fundamental to the comprehension of the entities senses of being, in special the sense of being of the present-at-hand, as well to a better understand of the Heidegger s notion of to signify. Following this path, we discuss a critical argument against Heidegger s concept of sense, whose central point lies in the notions of sign and remission, understood as analogous of the Frege s pair of concepts Sinn and Bedeutung . Assisted by our previous analysis, we show how this analogy between Frege and Heidegger fails, and in a single point: in considering sign as linguistic designator. By the end, we point out some considerations about the fruitfulness of the Heidegger s notion of sense (if it was taken together another notions treated in this work as, for example, relation and sign) to think in a broader way matters about intentionality and related issues.