Estudos sobre a teoria computacional da mente: o argumento gödeliano e o argumento anti-semântico
Ano de defesa: | 2017 |
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Autor(a) principal: | |
Orientador(a): | |
Banca de defesa: | |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Idioma: | por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
Brasil Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas |
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Palavras-chave em Português: | |
Link de acesso: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/16194 |
Resumo: | This dissertation analyzes two objections against the theory that human mind is a computational system. The first paper analyzes the arguments put forward by Kurt Gödel and John Randolph Lucas using incompleteness theorems to support the superiority thesis: the thesis that human mind is superior to any computational system ever built. Further, I point a flaw in one of those arguments and change it to an alternate hypothesis. The second paper analyzes John Searle’s anti-semantical argument against computationalism. That argument states that it is impossible for computational systems to possess semantical understanding. Instead, they would only be able to manipulate meaningless symbols. It is identified the theories which Searle is aiming with his critics and are pointed out some seeming mistakes in his understanding of them. Also, are identified how those misunderstandings are influential in his argumentation. Finally, I present a translation of John Randolph Lucas’s “Mind, machines and Gödel”, one of the most influential paper in discussions about how the incompleteness theorems allegedly makes impossible that human mind were a computational system. |