Estudos sobre a teoria computacional da mente: o argumento gödeliano e o argumento anti-semântico

• Ano de defesa: 2017
• Autor(a) principal: Santos, Pablo Rafael Rolim dos
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; Brasil; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
• Palavras-chave em Português: Teoremas da incompletude; Inconsistência; Kurt Gödel; John Randolph Lucas; Paraconsistência; Teoria computacional da mente; Searle; Argumento anti-semântico; Quarto chinês; Incompleteness theorems; Inconsistency; Paraconsistency; The computational theory of mind; John Searle; Anti-semantical argument; Chinese room; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/16194

This dissertation analyzes two objections against the theory that human mind is a computational system. The first paper analyzes the arguments put forward by Kurt Gödel and John Randolph Lucas using incompleteness theorems to support the superiority thesis: the thesis that human mind is superior to any computational system ever built. Further, I point a flaw in one of those arguments and change it to an alternate hypothesis. The second paper analyzes John Searle’s anti-semantical argument against computationalism. That argument states that it is impossible for computational systems to possess semantical understanding. Instead, they would only be able to manipulate meaningless symbols. It is identified the theories which Searle is aiming with his critics and are pointed out some seeming mistakes in his understanding of them. Also, are identified how those misunderstandings are influential in his argumentation. Finally, I present a translation of John Randolph Lucas’s “Mind, machines and Gödel”, one of the most influential paper in discussions about how the incompleteness theorems allegedly makes impossible that human mind were a computational system.