Três defesas do externalismo epistêmico

• Ano de defesa: 2010
• Autor(a) principal: Lopes, Arthur Viana
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Análise do conhecimento; Epistemologia naturalizada; Confiabilismo; Analysis of knowledge; Epistemology naturalized; Reliabilism; CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5689

The purpose of this dissertation is to defend the position known in epistemic literature as epistemic externalism. This position essentially consists in the thesis that some of the features which determine when a belief is a case of knowledge or a case of justified belief are external to the epistemic agent, i.e., they are not internal states of the agent, nor need to be consciously accessed by him. We neither criticize any particular internalist theory, nor advocate a particular externalist theory. Instead, we discuss three different topics that work as a general motivation for adopting externalism. The option for these topics is guided by an interest in naturalistic epistemology and in recent discussions of epistemology. First, we discuss the use of cases the description of imaginary cases with the intent to emphasize the intuition of a particular proposition or to show the counterintuitive consequence of a theory in the debate between internalists and externalists. We try to provide a sort of psychological diagnosis of the use of this intuitive tool and argue that the literature on concepts psychology suggests an advantage for externalist theories. Second, we discuss the contextualist approach about the skeptical paradox and its relation to conceptual analysis. We argue that a semantic approach fails to solve the paradox and that the proper understanding of its origin, and also an invariantist rejection of the contextualist approach, provide a motivation to accept the externalist solution of the problem. At last, we deal with John Pollock s criticism against externalism the idea that a proper naturalistic theory of justification has to be internalist. We analyze whether his refutation really affects all form of externalism, particularly, process reliabilism. We present Pollock s procedural theory of epistemic norms, and discuss if the reasons he presents can actually refute process reliabilism. We claim that the reasons presented do not really put Pollock s project in an advantage.