McDowell e o Conteúdo da Experiência: entre o proposicional e o intuicional
| Ano de defesa: | 2015 |
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| Autor(a) principal: | |
| Orientador(a): | |
| Banca de defesa: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
| Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: | por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
UFMG |
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Palavras-chave em Português: | |
| Link de acesso: | http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUBD-A28H95 |
Resumo: | This dissertationpresents John McDowell's change of position regarding the content of perceptual experience in his paper Avoiding the Myth of the Given (2009). In the first chapter I presentthe thesis of propositionality developed by McDowell in his book Mind and World(2005). With the theory of propositional content McDowell seeks to engage the mind tothe world in a rational way, as well as overcome the oscillationbetween coherentism/Myth of the Given. In the second chapter, Ipresent the main objections made against McDowells position. I present the objections made by Travis,who led McDowell to revise his propositionality thesis.In the third chapter, I present the position developed in Avoiding the Myth of the Given(2009c)as a response to Travis.The dissertation tries to show that, in this paper, McDowell defends a view according to which perceptual experience has a conceptual but nonpropositional content, here named intuitional content. Iconcludewith an evaluationof this content in respect to epistemological problems. |