Nome, objeto e sentido proposicional: realismo e antirrealismo no Tractatus

• Ano de defesa: 2016
• Autor(a) principal: Paulo Henrique Silva Costa
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Antirrealismo; Realismo; Objeto Simples; Nomes Simples; Wittgenstein; Wittgenstein, Ludwig , 1889-1951 Tractatus logico-philosophicus; Filosofia; Nome; Objeto
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUBD-ABYEMA

This Masters Thesis deals with the classic debate between realists and antirealists concerning the Tractatus. We attempt to show that, when one reading (realism) or another (anti-realism) is adopted, one does not adopt merely a different position, but a distinct project of interpretation for the book. Since both readings focus on a group of propositions of the book, they end up developing different and, to a large extent, opposed projects. The realistic reading, for example, due to its emphasis on group 2 propositions, assumes Wittgensteins types that determine the logical form of simple names; the anti-realistic reading, on the other hand, by emphasizing group 3 propositions, places Wittgenstein as an uncompromising defender of the contextual use of simple names. Our goal is to defend that the anti-realistic reading is more complete than the realistic one as a philosophical project, since it accounts for, in a consistent way, more propositions without, however, attributing non textual or metaphysical theses to Wittgenstein, as the realists do. This does not mean, however, that the anti-realistic thesis of the contextual use of names explains the details of the relation between language and reality that Wittgenstein proposes.