Empresas familiares x não familiares: impactos das aquisições corporativas no desempenho da empresa e na remuneração dos executivos

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2018
Autor(a) principal: Oliveira, Rafael Manoel de lattes
Orientador(a): Pimenta, Daiana Paula lattes
Banca de defesa: Pimenta, Daiana Paula, Cunha, Moisés Ferreira da, Porto, Rafael Barreiros
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Goiás
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-graduação em Contábeis (FACE)
Departamento: Faculdade de Administração, Ciências Contábeis e Ciências Econômicas - FACE (RG)
País: Brasil
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/8352
Resumo: This study aimed to verify if the acquisitions made by family companies generate better performance than those performed by non-family companies, and if there is a difference between the post-acquisition compensation of executives of family companies and executives from non- family companies of Brazilian companies listed in B3 in the period from 2009 to 2016. The research is supported mainly in the agency relations and the alignment of interests between the principal and the agent, studied by the Agency Theory. Data were collected through Thomson Reuters Ikon and the company reference form. Enterprises were classified as familiar or unfamiliar through the involvement and essential approaches. To achieve the objectives, three multiple regressions were estimated: two related to the performance of acquisitions, with data stacked and a sample of 244 acquisitions (86 companies), and one referring to executive compensation, with a sample of 96 companies with panel data not balanced. The results indicated that: i) Brazilian family firms tend to perform better with corporate acquisitions events compared to non-family acquisitions; and (ii) corporate acquisitions have a greater positive impact on the total remuneration of non-family business executives than on family firms. The results are consistent with the Agency Theory, which says that the gap between ownership and control creates agency conflicts and offers greater opportunities for expropriation by managers.