Cartelização e financiamento público dos partidos políticos: uma análise da democracia brasileira

• Ano de defesa: 2008
• Autor(a) principal: Andreis, Thiago Felker
• Orientador(a): Dias, Marcia Ribeiro
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul; Porto Alegre
• Palavras-chave em Português: PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS - BRASIL; PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS - FINANCIAMENTO; FUNDO PARTIDÁRIO - BRASIL
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/10923/1979

This research aims to analyze the modifications in the financing patterns of the Brazilian political parties, since the country’s return to multipartidarism. Using the perspective developed by Richard Katz and Peter Mair about the cartel-party, is it examined possible movements regarding parties financing towards more public or private sources of income, so that it becomes possible to see if there is, in the Brazilian system, a greater proximity and dependence from parties regarding Estate resources. In order to accomplish the proposed objectives, legal scenarios that ruled or were planned to rule since the 1970’s until nowadays were rebuilt, simulating the hypothetical distribution of public funds that the parties would have the right to receive. Simulations were done using analytical categories regarding parties sizes, so that it was possible to see a clear division in the way bigger and smaller parties acted regarding the distribution of public funding. It is also analyzed the importance of public funds in the parties accountability, by comparing changes along the years. In fact, it can be perceived that the cartel-party thesis isn’t fully applicable in the Brazilian reality. However, this approach can offer a few insights, since if we cannot talk in the existence of cartel-parties in Brazil, on the other hand, it seems to exist elements of cartelization among the bigger parties on those issues related to appropriation and distribution of public subsidies granted to parties.