Estratégia empresarial e a intensidade do conflito de agência: um estudo em unidades de negócios de atacado em uma instituição financeira brasileira

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2017
Autor(a) principal: Oliveira, Valdir Recalde de
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Positivo
Brasil
Pós- Graduação
Programa de Pós- Graduação em Administração
UP
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Link de acesso: https://repositorio.cruzeirodosul.edu.br/handle/123456789/1877
Resumo: The aim of this research was to analyze the correlation between agency conflict andexecutive’s performance in a Brazilian financial institution. The study was base in three constructs. The first one is about corporate strategy and its ability to generate competitive advantage, as explained by Porter (1996), Mintzberg et al (2010) and Barney and Hersterly (2011). The second construct presents the theory of the firm reported in a Jensen and Meckling (1976) study, which indicates the divergence of interests between the shareholder and the executive as a agency problem (agency theory). The third construct discusses the concepts of Balanced Scorecard (BSC) of Kaplan and Norton (1996), which introduces BSC as a methodology that amplifies the operational field’s strategy process, and also presents the following performance indicators: ROI (Return of Investment); EVA (Economic Value Added); and ROA (Return on Assests) – according to Padoveze (2006). This research is justified by the lack of scientific productions about the agency theory in financial institutions. It gives to the study an originality potential, also contributing to the strategic management of the segment. As methodology, quantitative study was used. In collecting data, a questionnaire was sent to the executives related to the investigation. The sample was composed by 69 executives of 82 participants. For the data analysis, we used descriptive statistics (mean, median and standard deviation), correlation analysis, multiple regression and mediation. The main contribution of this research lies in the deepening about the concepts of agency conflicts applied in financial institutions. From the present study, it is possible to safely dimension the impacts that agency conflicts can have on the outcome of a financial institution. The greatest contribution is the positive and moderate correlation between the intensity of agency conflict and the measure of ROI performance. The linear regression tests involving the "Employee Relationship to Employees" factors and the performance measurement ROI - Return on Investment showed a behavior whereupon 17.2% of the ROI is explained exclusively by the Executives vs. Employees factor, with a significance of 0.000. There was no evidence with scientifically acceptable significance in the presented hypotheses. Finally, we suggest future researches focused on the correlation results obtained with the Agency Conflict Intensity factor and ROI.