Familiarity, challenge and processing of persuasion messages

• Autor(a) principal: Fonseca, Ricardo Jorge Rodrigues Moita da
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositórios Científicos de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.12/1746
• topic: Psicologia social; Familiaridade; Desafio e ameaça; Modos de processar; Presença de outros; Social psychology; Familiarity; Challenge and threat; Modes of processing; Presence of others

This thesis investigates the relationship between an experience of familiarity and a motivational state of challenge with how information is processed in a persuasion context. Previous research on social cognition has suggested that familiarity not only impacts a wide range of cognitive processes, but also regulates the activation of a more analytic information-processing mode, an assumption of the Familiarity of As a Regulation Mechanism model (Garcia-Marques, 1999; Garcia-Marques et al., 2010). On a different field, research on the Biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat (Blascovich et al., 1993, 1999) has suggested that familiarity influences the activation of a motivational state of challenge. These two approaches suggest, therefore, that an experience of familiarity is able to influence both cognitive and motivational processes features. The overlap between the assumptions underlying both approaches is here explored being suggested the possibility that they might be closely related. For example, both approaches assume that an experience of familiarity signals individuals with necessary resources available and accessible in memory to deal with the situation. In this thesis, we have explored the relationship between these two approaches developing four experiments that could simultaneously inform about information-processing modes and assess the cardiovascular responses that typically map the motivational state. Experiment 1 showed the expected association of familiarity with non-analytical processing and at the same time the exhibition of a challenge type of cardiovascular responses. Interestingly these two effects that were activated by the same source, familiarity, did not seem to be related. Neither the observed cardiovascular indexes explained why individuals engaged in less analytic processing, nor did this processing mode was associated with the cardiovascular indexes. To continue exploring the relationship between these two effects, experiment 2 tested if the motivational state of challenge could promote less analytic processing by itself. Although the manipulation of motivational challenge did in fact influence how information was processed and was associated with the correspondent cardiovascular pattern of challenge, once again, the cardiovascular indexes were not related with the cognitive effect. The subsequent studies were designed to directly test the observed independence of both processes. We hypothesized that this observed dissociation could be in some way related with the fact that both processes depend on different levels of task-engagement. Experiment 3 replicates experiment 2 by manipulating the motivational state of challenge and adding to it a manipulation of task-engagement (presence versus absence of an observer). Results revealed that the two previously observed effects were only found in the task-engagement condition (i.e. in the presence of the observer). In experiment 4, we went back to the original study of the experience of familiarity and thus replicated experiment 1, adding to it the same manipulation of task-engagement. Results revealed that although the motivational effects disappeared in the low engagement condition (i.e. those who were alone), the cognitive impact was always observed regardless of the task-engagement level. To our view, these results are suggesting that the two effects here approached – the cognitive and motivational impact of familiarity, are related indeed. However, they are related under specific conditions, for example, the degree with which individuals are engaged with the task. As such, we claim that their co-occurrence does not mean that they are part of the same process. This assumption is discussed and a set of new experiments is proposed to further support it.