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Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schalka, Beatriz
Publication Date: 2014
Other Authors: sarfati, gilberto
Format: Article
Language: por
Source: Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa
DOI: 10.21529/RECADM.2014023
Download full: http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727
Summary: This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. 
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spelling Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in BrazilBoard of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in BrazilCorporate governance; control; board of directorsCorporate governance; control; board of directorsThis article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance.Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Sociais - IBEPESSchalka, Beatrizsarfati, gilberto2014-12-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/172710.21529/RECADM.2014023Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-3711677-7387reponame:Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativainstname:Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)instacron:FACECLAporhttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727/801http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/downloadSuppFile/1727/338Direitos autorais 2014 Beatriz Schalka, gilberto sarfatihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2019-07-03T03:06:26Zoai:periodicosibepes.org.br:article/1727Revistahttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/recadmONGhttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/recadm/oairecadm.editor@ibepes.org.br1677-73871677-7387opendoar:2019-07-03T03:06:26Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa - Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
title Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
spellingShingle Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
Schalka, Beatriz
Corporate governance; control; board of directors
Corporate governance; control; board of directors
Schalka, Beatriz
Corporate governance; control; board of directors
Corporate governance; control; board of directors
title_short Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
title_full Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
title_fullStr Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
title_full_unstemmed Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
title_sort Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
author Schalka, Beatriz
author_facet Schalka, Beatriz
Schalka, Beatriz
sarfati, gilberto
sarfati, gilberto
author_role author
author2 sarfati, gilberto
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv

dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Schalka, Beatriz
sarfati, gilberto
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Corporate governance; control; board of directors
Corporate governance; control; board of directors
topic Corporate governance; control; board of directors
Corporate governance; control; board of directors
description This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. 
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-12-31
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727
10.21529/RECADM.2014023
url http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727
identifier_str_mv 10.21529/RECADM.2014023
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727/801
http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/downloadSuppFile/1727/338
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Direitos autorais 2014 Beatriz Schalka, gilberto sarfati
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Direitos autorais 2014 Beatriz Schalka, gilberto sarfati
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Sociais - IBEPES
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Sociais - IBEPES
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371
1677-7387
reponame:Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa
instname:Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)
instacron:FACECLA
instname_str Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)
instacron_str FACECLA
institution FACECLA
reponame_str Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa
collection Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa - Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv recadm.editor@ibepes.org.br
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.21529/RECADM.2014023