Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil
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Publication Date: | 2014 |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | por |
Source: | Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa |
DOI: | 10.21529/RECADM.2014023 |
Download full: | http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727 |
Summary: | This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. |
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Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa |
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Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in BrazilBoard of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in BrazilCorporate governance; control; board of directorsCorporate governance; control; board of directorsThis article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance.Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Sociais - IBEPESSchalka, Beatrizsarfati, gilberto2014-12-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/172710.21529/RECADM.2014023Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-3711677-7387reponame:Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativainstname:Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)instacron:FACECLAporhttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727/801http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/downloadSuppFile/1727/338Direitos autorais 2014 Beatriz Schalka, gilberto sarfatihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2019-07-03T03:06:26Zoai:periodicosibepes.org.br:article/1727Revistahttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/recadmONGhttp://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/recadm/oairecadm.editor@ibepes.org.br1677-73871677-7387opendoar:2019-07-03T03:06:26Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa - Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
title |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
spellingShingle |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil Schalka, Beatriz Corporate governance; control; board of directors Corporate governance; control; board of directors Schalka, Beatriz Corporate governance; control; board of directors Corporate governance; control; board of directors |
title_short |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
title_full |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
title_fullStr |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
title_full_unstemmed |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
title_sort |
Board of directors and top management team. CEO relative power and financial returns in Brazil |
author |
Schalka, Beatriz |
author_facet |
Schalka, Beatriz Schalka, Beatriz sarfati, gilberto sarfati, gilberto |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
sarfati, gilberto |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Schalka, Beatriz sarfati, gilberto |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Corporate governance; control; board of directors Corporate governance; control; board of directors |
topic |
Corporate governance; control; board of directors Corporate governance; control; board of directors |
description |
This article investigates if companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others in Brazil. The works compares 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. Two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression. This paper has provided evidences that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. |
publishDate |
2014 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2014-12-31 |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
|
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727 10.21529/RECADM.2014023 |
url |
http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.21529/RECADM.2014023 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/view/1727/801 http://www.periodicosibepes.org.br/index.php/recadm/article/downloadSuppFile/1727/338 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Direitos autorais 2014 Beatriz Schalka, gilberto sarfati https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Direitos autorais 2014 Beatriz Schalka, gilberto sarfati https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Sociais - IBEPES |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos e Pesquisas Sociais - IBEPES |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371 Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371 Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa; v. 13, n. 3 (2014): Setembro-Dezembro; 356-371 1677-7387 reponame:Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa instname:Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA) instacron:FACECLA |
instname_str |
Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA) |
instacron_str |
FACECLA |
institution |
FACECLA |
reponame_str |
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa |
collection |
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa - Faculdade Cenecista de Campo Largo (FACECLA) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
recadm.editor@ibepes.org.br |
_version_ |
1822181974779887616 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.21529/RECADM.2014023 |