Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2021 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
ZAIDAN, Henrique Pinto dos Santos
 |
| Orientador(a): |
CRISTINO, Cláudio Tadeu |
| Banca de defesa: |
STOSIC, Borko,
STOSIC, Tatijana,
FIRMINO, Paulo Renato Alves |
| Tipo de documento: |
Tese
|
| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal Rural de Pernambuco
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós-Graduação em Biometria e Estatística Aplicada
|
| Departamento: |
Departamento de Estatística e Informática
|
| País: |
Brasil
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: |
|
| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
|
| Link de acesso: |
http://www.tede2.ufrpe.br:8080/tede2/handle/tede2/8752
|
Resumo: |
This thesis presents two mathematical models of pricing for warranty policies considering a game theory approach. The first model is a two-person game. The consumer outsources maintenance actions to the agent (maintenance agent), who shows four warranty options with different coverage characteristics. Equilibrium strategies for each decision-maker are obtained via the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. In the second model, we add the manufacturer in the modeling. Thus, a three-person game is formulated. The manufacturer defines the sale price of the product (including the base warranty costs), whereas the agent prices maintenance services. Equilibrium strategies are given through a combination of cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. The model brings a coalition between the manufacturer and the agent, and the Shapley value redistributes the payoffs and sets up the equilibrium prices. In both models, we perform a sensitivity analysis with the model parameters and apply computer simulation to estimate the expected value of warranty costs for some warranty policies. |
