Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2024 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Sado, Victor Yudi Ichihara |
| Orientador(a): |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
|
| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
| Palavras-chave em Português: |
|
| Link de acesso: |
http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/51686
|
Resumo: |
This dissertation deals with authority on practical reasoning. In light of the thesis of normal justification, I investigate how legitimate authority influences reasoning by claiming to provide practical reasons, specifically concerning second-order reasons.. In this sense, I analyze how a directive that epistemologically influences reasoning - but is treated as authoritatively binding - is able to serve as a reason for action. I relate this discussion to law, as it claims to guide behavior through its prescriptions and has a conceptual connection with authority. I suggest that possibly, a legal directive that functions as a source of evidence provides reasons that influence salience in reasoning, that is, first-order reasons. If the law claims to provide reasons for action, it must do so by serving as a non-normative source to trigger reasons for action that were already pre-existing. Thus, what we understand as the normativity of law consists of reasons for action that were created through the mediation of law. |
