A distinção entre o sentido negativo e positivo da liberdade na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes

• Ano de defesa: 2011
• Autor(a) principal: Hipolito, Marco André de Freitas
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Uberlândia; BR; Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia; Ciências Humanas; UFU
• Palavras-chave em Português: Boa vontade; Dever; Liberdade; Incondicional; Fato da razão; Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 - Crítica e interpretação; Filosofia moderna - Séc. XX; Good will; Duty; Freedom; Unconditional; Fact of reason; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/15542

The purpose of the present study is to analyze the distinction between the concept of freedom in a negative sense and that of freedom in a positive sense, also emphasizing the concepts Kant uses as a basis for morality under the idea of freedom in a positive sense. In the first chapter we analyze the Kantian thesis that only through a good will would there be the possibility of acting morally. Kant holds good will as a principle of volition, which must be determined in itself and which must be independent of any driving force mobile. This independence in relation to the empirical and contingent allows Kant to base morality on formal principles; in other words, reason formulates a priori unconditional moral laws, which determine the human will to act through duty. An action practiced through duty does not mean simply submission of reason to the a priori law, but renders the freedom of the will effective, for the will as a faculty of reason, upon formulating laws for itself, recognizes its freedom in the laws. In the second chapter of this work, we analyze the difference between acting in accordance with duty and acting through duty. Acting in accordance with duty always expresses an action that is not in keeping with the basis of morality. But an action practiced through duty requires that the will be determined by purely formal principles, that is, principles that must contain legislation that could never be extracted from the world of phenomena. The morality of an action lies in the unconditional character of the law and in the a priori form of the moral law. Thus, from the practical point of view, every human action must be commanded according to an internal need, free of any influx of experience. This need must be imposed by a purely rational law, of an unconditional character. In the third chapter, we seek to analyze the distinction between freedom in a negative sense and freedom in a positive sense. Based on this distinction, we proceed to analyze what properties of freedom are required for a universally valid morality. Once the properties of autonomy, of a priori and of the unconditionality of law are understood of freedom in a positive sense, Kant seems to indicate the possibility of demonstrating the objective reality of freedom, namely moral law. For if the will must be compelled by a categorical imperative, it must likewise be possible to indicate the existence of the law whose principles must be valid for all rational beings.