Renegociações dos contratos de concessões rodoviárias
Ano de defesa: | 2019 |
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Autor(a) principal: | |
Orientador(a): | |
Banca de defesa: | |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
Idioma: | por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Uberlândia
Brasil Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciências Contábeis |
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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Palavras-chave em Português: | |
Link de acesso: | https://repositorio.ufu.br/handle/123456789/25250 http://dx.doi.org/10.14393/ufu.di.2019.965 |
Resumo: | The concession contracts, because they are complex and long-lasting, are incomplete in nature, and therefore are subject to renegotiations to adjust them to the contingencies that were not contemplated in the contracts. However, the excessive use of renegotiations is an alert of opportunistic behavior that can harm public administration and users. As a result, this study aims to investigate the variables associated with the renegotiations of the concession contracts, in the common modality, of the Brazilian federal highways. For this purpose, data were collected on ANTT's website regarding the 22 concession contracts administered by this agency and the country's political and economic data. Twelve hypotheses were collected and, after the collection, descriptive and econometric statistics techniques, simple and multiple logistic regression were used. According to the results, six hypotheses were accepted: the associations between elapsed time, basic tariff value, regulatory quality indexes, corruption control and government effectiveness, and the year of federal elections with the occurrence of renegotiations. However, the other six hypotheses of association between the occurrence of renegotiations with the contract duration, concessioned extension, value of the investments, PIB variation, financial result and the governance indicator of the rule of law were rejected. |