Wittgenstein e os escritos sobre filosofia da psicologia: a visão de aspecto como tema

• Ano de defesa: 2019
• Autor(a) principal: Silva, Filicio Mulinari E [UNIFESP]
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP)
• Palavras-chave em Português: Seeing Aspects; Seeing-As; Psychological Verbs; Introspection; Expression.; Visão De Aspecto; Ver-Como; Verbos Psicológicos; Introspecção; Expressão.
• Link de acesso: https://sucupira.capes.gov.br/sucupira/public/consultas/coleta/trabalhoConclusao/viewTrabalhoConclusao.jsf?popup=true&id_trabalho=7749666; https://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/59207

The existence of a heterogeneous multiplicity of readings on Wittgenstein's notes written between 1945 and 1949 makes the period a fertile field of research on the philosopher's thought. In view of the dissenting diversity of interpretations, we will take Wittgenstein's writings on the philosophy of psychology as an object of research and propose the specific analysis of the seeing aspects (seeing-as). The main objective is to show that the theme of seeing-as, present since the first handwritten notes of the period, runs through the whole set of annotations written between 1946 and 1949. In this sense, we will try to highlight some topics related to the problem of the seeing aspects, as well as Wittgenstein's main interlocutors on the problem (especially Köhler and Gestalt Psychology theorists). At the end of the research, we aim to show the development made by Wittgenstein to the question of seeing-as, from the MS-130 (manuscript that opens the writings on philosophy of psychology) to the last revision of the typewriter made by the philosopher, namely TS 234 – equivalent to Part II of the Philosophical Investigations. In order to achieve these goals, we will divide the thesis into three parts, each one oriented by one of the dactyloscripts made in the period. In this sense, Part I will deal with the period from the beginning of 1946 to the first half of 1947, with TS 229 as the main reference. In this part, we will explain how the problem of seeing-as appears in the first notes of the period, and how to identify the theoretical context of the question, its main interlocutors and its basic theoretical presuppositions, in order to promote a closer reading of what Wittgenstein proposes in his considerations. Part II has the TS 232 as the central object and covers the notes made between the second half of 1947 and the first half of 1948. Here the idea is to show how Wittgenstein takes up some of the problems introduced in the previous period and presents new and more diversified ways of treatment for the issue, such as the proposal of plan for psychological concepts, the comparison of primitive hypothetical languages, and the analysis of how we have learned to use some terms. Part III takes as its object the notes made between the second half of 1948 and the first of 1949. The idea is to highlight Wittgenstein’s latest reviews and to reconstruct what we consider as Wittgenstein's “final version” based on TS 234, indicating the philosopher's solutions to the seeing-as problem.