A recepção de Frege da noção kantiana de existência

• Ano de defesa: 2006
• Autor(a) principal: Vaz, Bruno Rafaelo Lopes
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; BR; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Palavras-chave em Português: Ser; Existência; Predicado real; Predicado de nível superior; Juízos existenciais; Being; Existence; Real predicate; Higher-level predicate; Existential judgements; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9041

In this work the relationship between two famous conceptions of existence is investigated. The first, proposed by Kant, excludes the concept of existence from the set of possible predicates or properties of objects. The second, later proposed by Frege, treats the concept of existence as a higher-level predicate, i.e., it presents this concept as a predicate of predicates rather than as a predicate of objects. A closer look at these conceptions reveals, however, that despite this similarity it would be premature to identify their conceptions, because there are differences with regard to the systems in which they are embedded as well as differences with regard to the aims that they pursue. The present work tries to show that Kant developed his conceptions of the concept of existence in an epistemological context whose aim was, as he makes clear in his opus magnum, to warrant the claim that every knowledge should have besides a conceptual element also a counterpart arising from the intuition. Frege, on the other hand, develops his conception in a basically logical context, in which the treatment of expressions is submitted to strong rigor. The aim of the present work is to compare Kant s and Frege s approaches in order to answer the question whether there are significant differences between their characterizations of the concept of existence and, if so, which ones. One important result of the present work is that the differences in their positions are consequences of some differences between the contexts in which they are developed. Another result is that their conceptions include some common theses, such as the claim that the concept of existence is not a concept that can be used to characterize an object, or the claim that existential statements constitute an odd type of judgement whose appearance in natural languages suggests an erroneous reading of them. On the other hand, however, there are significant differences between the positions advocated by Kant and Frege as, for instance, differences with regard to the possibility of deriving statements of existence from the analysis of concepts, a possibility that is categorically denied by Kant but admitted, with some qualifications, by Frege. The third important result finally is that Frege s conception of existence must be regarded as an improvement, not as a mere repetition, of Kant s conception.