A questão da inversão fenomenológica de Michel Henry: a fenomenalidade da vida e o ser como autoafecção

• Ano de defesa: 2024
• Autor(a) principal: Pagnussat, Janessa
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; Brasil; Filosofia; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
• Palavras-chave em Português: Edmund Husserl; Cogito cartesiano; Autoafecção; Afetividade; Inversão fenomenológica; Cogito cartesian; Auto-affection; Affectivity; Phenomenological inversion; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/31639

The present work aims to defend the phenomenological inversion as a method to interpret the question of the ego in the phenomenology of Michel Henry from the analysis of the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl. First, it will be presented the historicalconceptual assumptions for the conception of phenomenology in the history of philosophy, especially with the emergence of the theory of Edmund Husserl. Given this, an approach of the conceptual apparatus of Husserl’s phenomenology will be made from the material Phenomenology of Michel Henry. At this point, some henryan objections will be brought to the constitution of Transcendental Ego and especially to the intentional Husserlian method. In addition, the thesis will seek the gaps that Henry points out in his theory in order to elucidate the auto-assessment of being, the original ego, that is, the pure phenomenality that is donated to the being of the ego. In this sense, from the Cartesian Meditations we will travel the inverse path of being to its phenomena. It turns out that henryan phenomenology brings a new interpretation from the ego cogito and that Husserl has not stopped at some understandings of cartesian rational theory. Thus, we will resume the analysis of the cartesian cogito in order to explain the beginning of being. Henry shows in Descartes that there is an original beginning that historical phenomenology has failed to interpret. Therefore, this henryan return to cartesianism presents two paths: if there is something that escapes thought as appearing original and how escapes as immanent bestowal to being. The concepts of videre videor will become important to describe the phenomenological seeing and feeling bringing the pure phenomenality as an appearance originating from the ego’s being reinterpreting an anteriority to the Cartesian cogito and that had not been brought by phenomenology until then. In this way, it becomes necessary a study of being to its auto-assessment - auto-affection - as a revelation of phenomenality. Immanence and non-intentionality become central concepts for the interpretation of phenomenological matter and how the donation of these phenomena of being occurs as auto-affection, in which the being is auto-affected in itself. In this perspective, it is intended to bring the interpretation of affectivity as phenomenological matter and the principles that the young Henry elucidates for the radicalization of his theory as an original Phenomenology. The research will focus on how the donation of this pure phenomenality occurs in the immanent structure of being, and it is only possible to understand the method from the Material Phenomenology.