Análise das lógicas institucionais na aplicação de sanções administrativas nas aquisições públicas: o caso da Base Administrativa da Guarnição de Santa Maria

• Ano de defesa: 2024
• Autor(a) principal: Faria, Jorge Rodrigo
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria; Brasil; Administração Pública; UFSM; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Gestão de Organizações Públicas; Centro de Ciências Sociais e Humanas
• Palavras-chave em Português: Lógicas institucionais; Sanções nas aquisições públicas; Eficiência; Institutional logics; Sanctions on public acquisitions; Efficiency; CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ADMINISTRACAO::ADMINISTRACAO PUBLICA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/32655

The application of administrative sanctions in public procurement is a crucial topic to ensure compliance and efficiency in contracting. This study investigates how bureaucratic and managerial institutional logics influence these sanctions in the Administrative Base of the Santa Maria Garrison (B Adm Gu SM). The objective is to analyze the relationship between these logics and the effectiveness of sanctions applied between 2019 and 2022. A descriptive quantitative approach was used, with content analysis, correspondence analysis and fsQCA, focusing on sanctioning processes. The results indicate that bureaucratic logic predominates in the application of sanctions, with strong associations between procedural variables. Around 65% of the cases analyzed refer to partial or total non-performance of contracts. No evidence of hybridization with managerial logic was found, and micro-enterprises (MEs) face significant challenges, representing 40% of cases of contractual non-execution. The analysis revealed that the presentation of justifications occurs in 60% of cases, but does not avoid penalties when combined with non-execution. Furthermore, 60% of the most severe penalties are associated with low-value items, reflecting a paradox between the severity of sanctions and high transaction costs. The recurrence of punishments is high, with 80% of suppliers previously penalized being sanctioned again, indicating that sanctions are more symbolic than substantive. In this way, sanctions contribute little to the real improvement of contractual performance. The conclusions indicate that administrative sanctions predominantly reflect a bureaucratic logic, with limited effectiveness in promoting contractual compliance and efficiency in acquisitions. The need for legislators to actually consider managerial logic when purchasing items with low specificity is highlighted to reduce transaction costs and improve efficiency in public procurement.