A responsabilização criminal no estado democrático de direito: o equilíbrio entre a efetividade e os limites da pretensão punitiva da sociedade

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Araújo, Kleber Martins de
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito
• Departamento: Constituição e Garantias de Direitos
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Direitos fundamentais. Estado democrático de direito. Pretensão punitiva da sociedade. Excesso. Insuficiência
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Fundamental rights. Democratic state law. The company claim punitive. Excess. Failure
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::DIREITO::DIREITO PUBLICO::DIREITO PENAL
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/13942

This paper analyzes the relationship between fundamental rights and the exercise of the claim punitive society in a democratic state. It starts with the premise that there are fundamental rights that limit and determine the validity of all forms of manifestation of the claim punitive society (legislating, investigative, adjudicative or ministerial) and there are others that require the state the right exercise, fast and effective of these activities. Travels to history in order to see that the first meaning of these rights was built between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, after all a history of abuses committed by state agents in the exercise of criminal justice, and positively valued in the declarations of human rights and proclaimed in the constitutions after the American and French Revolutions, while the second meaning has been assigned between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when, because of the serious social problems generated largely by absenteeism state, it was noted that in addition to subjective rights the individual against the state, fundamental rights are also objective values, which trigger an order directed the state to protect them against the action of the offending individuals themselves (duty to protect), the mission of which the State seeks to discharge, among other means, through the issue of legal rules typifying the behavior detrimental to such rights, subject to penalties, and the concrete actions of public institutions created by the Constitution to operate penal law. Under this double bias, it is argued that the rule violates the Constitution in the exercise of the claim punitive society as much as by excess malfere fundamental rights that limit, as when it allows facts wrong by offending fundamental rights, remain unpunished either by inaction or by insufficient measures taken abstractly or concretely provided