A inferência causal na filosofia moral de Hume.

• Ano de defesa: 2007
• Autor(a) principal: Jota, Renato de Medeiros
• Orientador(a): Bonaccini, Juan Adolfo
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia
• Departamento: Metafísica
• País: BR
• Palavras-chave em Português: Filosofia moral; Inferências causais; Teoria da percepção; Hume; Causa e efeito
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Moral Philosophy; Causal inferences; Theory of perception; Hume; Causation
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/16451

Starting from the idea that the result of the Humean analysis of causal inferences must be applied coherently to the remaining part of his work, including its moral theory, the present master thesis aims at investigating whether Hume´s moral philosophy is essentially based on feeling, or whether this would not be rather essentially a consequence of our causal inferences in human actions and deliberations. The main idea consists in showing that our moral inferences, to the extent that they are for Hume empirical , depend on our belief in a connexion between something which has been previously observed and something which is not being observed ( but that it is expected to occur or to be observed in the future). Thus, this very belief must base our moral inferences concerning the actions and deliberations of the individuals. Therefore, must e o ipso induce us to associate actions and behaviors, as well as character and moral claims of men to certain moral feelings. Accordingly, the thesis is unfolded in three chapters. In the first chapter Hume´s theory of the perception is reported as essential part of the explanation or the principles that bind ideas in our mind and constitute our inferences. In the second chapter, the Humean analysis of causal inferences is presented and the way they contribute in the formation of our moral inferences is explained. In the third and last chapter, the formation of our moral inferences and the real contribution of the doctrine of freedom and necessity for the examination or our actions are analysed and discussed.