Efeitos das reformas eleitorais de 2015 e 2017 nas eleições proporcionais de 2018

• Ano de defesa: 2020
• Autor(a) principal: Lemos, Letícia Maia
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraíba; Brasil; Relações Internacionais; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Eleições; Partidos políticos; Coligação; Reforma eleitoral; Elections; Political parties; Coalition; Electoral reform; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::CIENCIA POLITICA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/18673

The survey analyzes the impacts of the 2015 and 2017 electoral reforms on the proportional elections of 2018, focusing the examination on four main changes in the electoral dispute: the requirement that only candidates who obtain an individual vote equal to or greater than 10% of their state's Electoral Quotient can occupy the seats won by the party/coalition; the inclusion of parties/coalitions that did not reach the Electoral Quotient of their district in the distribution of leftovers or averages; the ban on electoral coalitions for proportional elections from 2020. From a simulation exercise with the 2018 electoral results, we see that, without the coalitions, we would have less party fragmentation, measured by the Effective Number of Parties (NEP), however, only one party would no longer have representation in the Chamber of Deputies. On the other hand, simulating the isolated inclusion of each of the new rules: the “toll” of 10% of the Electoral Quotient as a minimum individual vote for the election of candidates and the inclusion of parties / coalitions that did not reach the Electoral Quotient in the distribution of leftovers , we see that, in isolation, these changes did not significantly change the composition of the Chamber. Finally, we see that of the 30 parties elected in 2018, only 11, by 2030, would meet the requirements of the performance clause, showing a propensity to reduce the fragmentation of our legislature.