Sobre possíveis fundamentos do fenômeno dos direitos humanos

• Ano de defesa: 2013
• Autor(a) principal: Fragoso, Williard Scorpion Pessoa
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: fundamentação; direitos humanos; Rabossi; foundation; human rights; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5644

The present work addresses the issue of human rights foundation in the philosophical perspective. The approach of the research is divided into five parts: (i) a historical-conceptual reconstruction of human rights, (ii) a general description of its rationale, (iii) a presentation of the possible foundations of human rights, (iv) the criticisms and paradoxes of the possibility of a foundation of human rights and, finally, (v) the human rights approach by the thinking of the Argentine philosopher Eduardo Rabossi. In the first part of the work, the historical and conceptual understanding of the matter of the foundation is hinged through the relationship between natural law and positive law. Then, it presents a general and philosophical characterization of the foundation matter and its problems through philosophical western tradition and strictly as "foundationalism" (strong, moderate and weak foundationalism) through contemporary epistemology. The second and third parts deal respectively with, some examples-attempts of human rights foundation and paradoxes-problems concerning rationality and right. Finally, it is presents the understanding of the Argentine philosopher Eduardo Rabossi as a proposal to overcome the matter of human rights foundation and as a general and propositional paradigm of philosophical research in human rights. In this sense, human rights are interpreted as a "phenomenon" i.e., as a culminating "historic event" that has a historical-cultural tradition established. Thus, the question of foundation must be faced according to internal determinations of the phenomenon of human rights. The overall objective of the work is to show that, although the foundation of human rights is paradoxically possible, as "foundations", always open to the action-reflection, it is not necessary, nor desirable, from the strictly philosophical and rational point of view as a strong foundation, i.e., as an absolute certainty. It is not necessary because human rights as "lively historical phenomenon" waiver this need, it is not desirable because it carries the risk of becoming a "fundamentalism" of human rights.