A crítica Habermasiana ao conceito de interesse de Kant

• Ano de defesa: 2015
• Autor(a) principal: Pinto, Vera Lucia
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraíba; Brasil; Filosofia; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Habermas; Kant; Interesse; Conhecimento; Crítica; Interest; Knowledge; Critique; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/123456789/14015

This thesis presents of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1929) to the Kant’s concept of interest (1724 – 1804), having as base the work Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), as well as quotes from Kant’s work, that means the three Critiques. The concept of interest of reason in kant arises from the question: “How are possible the A priori synthetic judges? The answer tothis question leads us to the classic question of the Critique of Pure Reason about the knowledge. Having the first clue to an answer the latter already see clear all the study of Kant’s philosophy about the validity of an a priori for practical purposes to the problem of knowledge. Given the undeniable involvement of reason with the practical life, it becomes evident that all efforts of criticism by Kant is intended for practical purposes. In his Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas develops the foundations of this theory of cognitive interests, where he presupposes the inseparable unity of knowledge and interest for both the natural sciences and to the historical-hermeneutic sciences. Looking so close, we can realize that is rising here the big project of Knowledge and Human Interests (1968). At this time, followed by ctiticism of positivism, Habermas proposes the objective study of the issues raised around the interests. And this is what he calls “critical theory task”. This thesis has as general aim of research the analysis of the concept of interest, employed by Jürgen Habermas within the limits of the work Knowledge and Human Interests (1968), in order to: “Clarify mutual connections between knowledge and interest, in the sense expressed by Habermas himself: “The concept of interest as a guide of knowledge implies both formative moments: knowledge and interest” (Habermas in Col. Os Pensadores, 1985, p. 307/308). Approaching the initial founding relations of the concept of interest in Kant, notably in Three Critiques, privileging particular moments (quotes) of this works. Presenting connections between the concept of interest and the critical theory in the sense that, to Habermas, the entire movement of the critical theory takes into account the guiding interest of knowledge, therefore, it is selfclarifying.