Semântica-I: questões fundacionais

• Ano de defesa: 2014
• Autor(a) principal: Silva, Adriano Marques da
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal da Paraí­ba; BR; Filosofia; Programa de Pós Graduação em Filosofia; UFPB
• Palavras-chave em Português: Interface sintaxe-semântica; Gerativismo; Forma lógica; Composicionalidade; Syntax - semantics interface; Gerativism; Logical form; Compositionality; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: https://repositorio.ufpb.br/jspui/handle/tede/5658

The problem being addressed in this thesis can be formulated as follows: what is the relationship between the notion of an internalized linguistic competence, as conceived by the generative program, and a semantic theory? In other words, what is the extend and scope of a semantic theory consistent with the theoretical assumptions and the syntactic model assumed by the generative program? Two approaches are compared: the denotational approach, according to which syntactic derivations are inputs to the truth conditional interpretation and the intensional approach , according to which the syntactic derivations constrain, but do not determine, truth conditions .I argue that the first approach leads us to a dilemma : if the semantic structure is isomorphic to the syntagmatic structure, we multiply the terms of explanation, without explanatory gain. If there is no isomorphism, we have even more serious problems, because we could not explain the explanatory success of certain syntactic principles (such as the asymmetry between external argument and internal argument , for example) . Thus, this proposal does not provide the proper kind of idealization, it s not able to extend the positive heuristic of the generative program. I argue that the second proposal, by contrast, increases the positive heuristic of the program because it is able to explain ( and not simply redescribe) important empirical generalizations discovered by the generative program over the years . I argue that the formulation of an I-semantics requires, necessarily, a revision of traditional and tacitly accepted assumptions regarding the nature of the formal study of natural languages semantics. I-Semantics explains the etiology of the computational principles underlying interface phenomena, not the implementation of these operations, how sentences can be used to make true or false assertions.