Opacidade em fundos de investimento multimercado

• Ano de defesa: 2017
• Autor(a) principal: Flavia Vital Januzzi
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Opacidade; Derivativos; Fundos multimercados; Administração
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUBD-AXFKS4

A fund is considered opaque if the information related to its volatility and return is not comprehended and/or available for a considerable number of current and potential unitholders(Sato, 2014). This phenomenon becomes worse when managers use complex assets to structure their funds portfolio. Complex assets are defined by Brunnermeier, Oehmke and Jel (2009), as those whose payoffs cannot be understood or even forecasted by investors, such as, derivatives. Considering these ideas, this study analyzed if the increase in hedge fund opacity, caused by the greater position of its net worth in derivatives, was associated with the variation of the risk level, the adjusted return and the flow of resources in Brazilian hedge funds. Three perspectives were investigated: a) the total sample (chapter 4); b) only the segment of hedge funds that charge performance fees which allowed the analysis of potential agency problems between unitholders and managers (chapter 5); c) the group of leveraged and unleveraged funds (chapter 6). In summary, in chapter 4 it was found a positive association between derivatives and the risk variation, and a negative relation between derivatives and performance (in the long and short terms). In general, there is evidence that derivatives were related to inflows in a negative way only in the segment of qualified investors. Nonetheless, it was observed that funds classified as Strategy by ANBIMA (i.e. those in which leverage operations are allowed) attracted more financial resources when they were directed to nonqualified investors. With regard to chapter 5, agency problems between mangers and investors were not identified; however, conflicts of interest were identified in the leveraged funds directed to non-qualified unitholders. Finally, specifically for chapter 6, the results were consistent with the tournament theory proposed by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996). By incorporating the derivative usage in the analysis I verified that loser funds able to leverage, characterized by those that were in the lower percentile of return in some semesters, amplified their investments in opaque assets. It resulted in an increase of the total risk, the economic exposure (systematic risk) and the occurrence of negative returns (downside risk). Yet it is important to highlightthat unitholders of loser funds do not receive higher adjusted return as compensation for the higher risk faced.