As duas faces do jogo presidencial : coordenação da coalizão por meio da sinalização via mídia como estratégia complementar aos recursos formais (Brasil, 1995 – 2010)

• Ano de defesa: 2020
• Autor(a) principal: Alessandra Rodrigues Costa Fonseca
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Brasil; FAF - DEPARTAMENTO DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciência Política; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Presidencialismo; Gabinetes multipartidários; Urgência; Sinalização de preferências; Ciência política - Teses; Presidencialismo - Teses
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/71325

Is there anything more to explain the legislative success of Brazilian presidents than the already recognized institutional power to control the agenda? This thesis's question turns to the procedural dynamics responsible for leading to this outcome, directing the focus to the interaction between resources of different natures. The central argument is that, under certain conditions, the executive chiefs have incentives to combine the formal prerogative of urgency petition with the informal resource of sending signals via the media to coalition members about their policy preferences. This game is derived from the constraints imposed on presidents in the conformation of the multiparty cabinets. The attributes that qualify the design of this structure are related to the degree of heterogeneity and coalescence rate of such cabinets. Thus, the analysis connects the presidential choices in the ministerial arena to the movements triggered in the legislative arena, aimed at coordinating the coalition to achieve collective action. The results show that cabinets with a higher degree of heterogeneity increase the chances of combining the two resources while reducing the occurrence of the urgency petition. By its way, higher coalescence rate also implies more chances of occurrence of this combination. There are, however, indications that the presidential option, in this case, is for acting in the legislature only with the use of formal recourse. The timing in which this combination strategy is put into practice is associated with the final stage of the legislative process. The work observes the four possible alternatives in this universe of presidential choice, namely, (I) use only urgency petition; (ii) use only signaling preferences via the media.; (iii) combination of both; Or (iii) no action—; The analysis indicates that, in fact, the set of resources available to the president is broader than his constitutional prerogatives, which allows him to expand his latitude of movement throughout the legislative process - and thus produce the result of collective action around the government agenda. The study is focused on the Brazilian case, in the period between 1995-2010.