Razão e sentimento no livro I do Tratado de David Hume: uma leitura cética acadêmica

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Wendel de Holanda Pereira Campelo
• Tipo de documento: Tese
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Filosofia; Epistemologia; Hume, David, 711-1776; Razão; Ceticismo
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-BAHP5E

The general aim of our work is to point out the relationship betweenskepticism and the concept of sentiment in Book I of Humes Treatise. For this purpose, we will first present in which way the Humean philosophical position can be understood as skeptical, and secondly, to define which type of skepticism is to closer this position. Thus, we argue that Hume adheres ultimately to academic skepticism, based on (A) his skeptical commitment with intellectual virtues and with (B) a positive epistemology, both compatible with his skepticism. There is also an innovative aspectof Hume's academicism which, instead of determining the legitimacy of his"inventions and discoveries" solely on the basis of his cognitive faculties, it does still submits the principles of his philosophy to public assessment.However, we do not consider Hume's positive epistemology to be entirelysimilar to the academic criterion based on what is truth-like, since his approach often not only operates with his own concepts that are quite different from ancient skepticism, but also it proposes very original solutions in opposition to radical consequences of skeptical arguments. In this way, Hume introduces the concept of sentiment into the modern skeptical debate with quite originality, in order to define the role of reason in our cognitive process, which fulfills commitments (A) and (B). At this point, we identify Hume as a sentimental skeptic, since the concept of sentiment is, in our reading, an important component for a better explanation of his position. Take heed that with this proposal we are not only pointing out the importantfunction of sentiment, as a natural belief, by undermining the excessive implications of skeptical doubt, but also as a motivating aspect of its own mitigated or academic skepticism. In this sense, our reading allows for a fruitful dialogue with Pyrrhonian interpretive tradition in regarding to Book I of Treatise (Popkin, Fogelin and Baxter). Our main distinction with respect to these interpreters is that for them, Hume's skepticism provides a negative epistemology that would weaken any attempt of justification of beliefs, whereas, as we shall see in this work, Hume sustains an epistemology to able from accepting, correcting or even rejecting beliefs and then submit them for public assessment. Therefore, though Hume operates with his ownconcepts, we will argue in this work that a reading of the academic skeptic bias provides an important touchstone for a better explanation of Part 4 of Book I of Treatise