Verdade e práxis em Heidegger e Aristóteles

• Ano de defesa: 2013
• Autor(a) principal: Vitor Sommavilla de Souza Barros
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; UFMG
• Palavras-chave em Português: Propriedade; Apropriação; Destruição; Verdade; Phronesis; Aristóteles; Filosofia; Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976; Fenomenologia
• Link de acesso: http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-ASBF54

This thesis analyzes Heideggers appropriation of the Aristotelian philosophy, in the course of the 1920s. In the first chapter, a critical turn to Aristotle will be understood as a necessity for Heidegger, given his background, intellectual influences and philosophical projects. The second and third chapters examine central topics of Heideggers interpretation of Aristotle. First, a claim will be made that truth, as it is thought by Heidegger in connection with Aristotle and Husserl, has three valid meanings, namely truth as a property of propositions, intuitive truth and truth as beingtheres openness. Moments of proximity and rupture between Heidegger and Aristotle will be highlighted, particularly regarding the intimate relation between the phenomena of truth and being, present in the notion of unconcealment. Next, the Heideggerian insertion of Aristotles practical philosophy in the questioning of being is analyzed. In this context, the intellectual virtue of prudence stands out, as it is a form of wisdom pertaining to the contingent situation of action. Towards the end of third chapter, criticism presenting authenticity as a form of contemplative isolation will be rejected and certain parallels between concepts of Aristotles practical philosophy and Heideggers fundamental ontology will be drawn. The purpose of these parallels is to reveal that the presence of Aristotles work in Heideggers thinking is much more important than the latter explicitly suggests.