Detalhes bibliográficos
| Ano de defesa: |
2023 |
| Autor(a) principal: |
Teixeira, Rafael Arcanjo
 |
| Orientador(a): |
Rezende, Cristiano Novaes de
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| Banca de defesa: |
Rezende, Cristiano Novaes de,
Itokazu, Ericka Marie,
Vieira Neto, Paulo |
| Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
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| Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: |
por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Goiás
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| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL)
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| Departamento: |
Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RMG)
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| País: |
Brasil
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| Palavras-chave em Português: |
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| Palavras-chave em Inglês: |
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| Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
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| Link de acesso: |
http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/13358
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Resumo: |
In our study, we explore the issue of abstraction in Spinoza, emphasizing his critique and its relation to the understanding of the mind as an integral part of Reality. Spinoza oscillates between a radical and moderate anti-abstractionism, recognizing that the same cognitive process can be both abstraction and another form of thinking, depending on the level of consciousness involved. Through Spinoza's analysis of abstraction, we find a critique of what we call "self-abstraction" — a form of thinking that places the individual as a detached entity from Reality, observing it from the outside as if not effectively participating in it. Despite critiquing abstraction, Spinoza does not completely reject it. For him, the dangers of abstractions are amplified when the mind is alienated from its own action and reifies its modes of thinking into concrete ideas. Finally, we argue that Spinoza's critique of abstractions is grounded in his materialism, in which the mind can only understand itself by understanding its participation in the Whole. Thus, Spinoza's proposed reflective approach as an epistemic method does not lead to the individualistic solipsism that separates us from the world, but guides us to the intricacies of the reality in which we participate |
