Singularidade e intuição: Kant contra a teoria leibniziana das representações singulares

• Ano de defesa: 2016
• Autor(a) principal: Scaramal, Elliot Santovich
• Orientador(a): Santoro, Thiago Suman
• Banca de defesa: Santoro, Thiago Suman , Rezende, Cristiano Novaes de, Pinheiro, Ulysses
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Goiás
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL)
• Departamento: Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG)
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Kant; Leibniz; Termos singulares; Intuição; Noção completa
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Kant; Leibniz; Singular terms; Intuition; Complete notion
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/6444

The main goal of this dissertation is to offer both an interpretation to the theory of singular representations as presented by Leibniz in his writings from the 1680’s, as well as a hypothesis of a criticism made by Kant to what we take to be the cornerstones of such a theory. These cornerstones consist in (i) the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (ii) the Doctrine of the Complete Notion of the Individual Substance (iii) the Intensional Definitions of the Truth Values. Once the writings in which (ii) and (iii) are presented only began to be published in the XIX century, we argue in favor of the plausibility of such a hypothesis by means of logical arguments, which intend to show that Kant could have deduced (ii) and (iii) from Leibniz’ commitment to (i) as well as to the existence of a parfaite représentation of ordinary objects in the divine understanding, and historical arguments, which intend to show that Kant could have had access to both (ii) and (iii) and even ascribed these to Leibniz by means of Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre and Wolff’s Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. We will add to these, also textual arguments in order to show that there is in Kant’s philosophy not only a critique to (i), but also to (ii) e (iii), as well as an interpretation of what this criticism consists in.