Uma investigação acerca da noção fenomênica de “indeterminação” no final do período intermediário de Wittgenstein

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Elias, Bruna Garcia da Silveira Miguel
• Orientador(a): Velloso, Araceli Rosich Soares
• Banca de defesa: Velloso, Araceli Rosich Soares, Porto, André da Silva, Ferraz Neto, Bento Prado de Almeida
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Goiás
• Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL)
• Departamento: Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG)
• País: Brasil
• Palavras-chave em Português: Wittgenstein; Indeterminação; Fenomenologia; Generalidade lógica; Vagueza; Reducionismo; Elementaridade; Paradigma
• Palavras-chave em Inglês: Indeterminacy; Phenomenology; Logical generality; Vagueness; Elementarity; Reductionism; Paradigm
• Área do conhecimento CNPq: FILOSOFIA::LOGICA
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/9064

This dissertation is an investigation of the notions of “indeterminacy”, “inexactness” and “vagueness” in the context of Wittgenstein's phenomenology during in the intermediary period of the author. The occurrence of vague terms in phenomenological expressions seems a problem to be solved, since it gives rise to some dissatisfaction with the lack of “precision” which should be a feature of any suitable language. We will deal with this “problem” about the vagueness expressions and some reflections about it, specifically as they were presented by Wittgenstein in the work Phenomenal Language. We explore in this dissertation some changes in the thought of this philosopher, from the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus to the text Phenomenal Language, with the intention of identifying, clarifying and later proposing modes to overcome the mistakes from the new ideas of Wittgenstein throughout the intermediate period, as they are rejected by the philosopher himself in the mentioned text. Such illusions, according to Wittgenstein, would be responsible for certain illusory conceptions about “language” and “perception” itself. We shall deal with some of Wittgenstein's notes on these misleading conceptions, seeking to show their connection with an old Tractarian idea, called of “doctrine of the simple” by Fogelin, and which we‟ll refer to as the “paradigm of logical elementarity” in this dissertation. We will try to sort out how this paradigm about logical “simplicity” or “elementarity” would have led to a misunderstanding about the kind of “logical generality” involved in several domains, especially the empirical and the phenomenal, as in the intervening period. Our aim is to spot out and examine such misunderstandings with the intention of overcoming them, and thus perhaps offer a proper treatment of language and perception which would allow us to understand the kind of “logical generality” involved in the phenomenal realm, and thus understand what that is meant by “indeterminacy”, “inaccuracy” or “vagueness” in those contexts.