Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: |
2009 |
Autor(a) principal: |
MAIONE, Vinícius Rodrigues
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Orientador(a): |
VELLOSO, Araceli Rosich Soares
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Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
Tipo de documento: |
Dissertação
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Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
Idioma: |
por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Federal de Goiás
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Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Mestrado em Filosofia
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Departamento: |
Ciências Humanas
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País: |
BR
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Palavras-chave em Português: |
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Palavras-chave em Inglês: |
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Área do conhecimento CNPq: |
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Link de acesso: |
http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tde/774
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Resumo: |
The objective of this dissertation is to present Gottlob Frege s criticism of psychologism in Mathematics and Logic. Our working hypothesis is that Frege s criticism is based on his notion of an "abstract object". In order to investigate this hypothesis we will contrast the pre and post paradox phases of Fregean s philosophy. We will try to show that there is a continuity between these two periods, and that this continuity depends on Frege s insistence in maintaining the notion of an "abstract object", even if in a somewhat weakened version. Our dissertation will be divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, we will make a brief characterization of psychologism in order to circumscribe the exact focus of Frege s criticism. In the second chapter we will discuss the notion of an "abstract object" in the pre-paradox period of Frege s philosophy and its connection to Frege s main concern: that of defining number upon a pure logical basis. Eventually, in the third chapter, we will show how, even without a logically unassailable method of introducing logical objects, due to Russell s paradox, the philosopher does not give up his main theses concerning the nature of logic and mathematics. They are still grounded on the notion of an "abstract object", even thought in a somewhat feebler form. |