Interlocução e analogias enganadoras no The big typescript e no Livro azul de Wittgenstein

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2020
Autor(a) principal: Costa , Paulo Henrique Silva lattes
Orientador(a): Porto, André da Silva lattes
Banca de defesa: Porto, André da Silva, Engelmann, Mauro Luiz, Carvalho, Marcelo Silva de, Silva, Guilherme Ghisoni da, Velloso, Araceli Rosich Soares
Tipo de documento: Tese
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Universidade Federal de Goiás
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia (FAFIL)
Departamento: Faculdade de Filosofia - FAFIL (RG)
País: Brasil
Palavras-chave em Português:
Palavras-chave em Inglês:
Área do conhecimento CNPq:
Link de acesso: http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/10823
Resumo: The present thesis deals with the crucial role that “misleading analogies” play in relation to the formulation and dissolution of philosophical problems in Wittgenstein. For this, we will restrict our discussion to the end of the middle period and the beginning of the final period, respectively, to The Big Typescript (1932-1933) and the Blue Book (1933-1934). The reason why we will restrict the discussion to this period of transition concerns the fact that there is a growing concern of Wittgenstein about the pragmatic character of language there, which we will call in the text “interlocutory conception of language”. Therefore, we will argue that, during the transition period between The Big Typescript and the Blue Book, there is a change in respect to the conception of language in question, supported, firstly, by the idea of “grammar as a system of rules”, which we will refer to as conception of language that “operates in a vacuum” and, secondly, in the pragmatic character of language, which we will refer to as a language that describes “interlocutory situations”. In this way, we will show that the notion of “rule” behind each conception of language is distinct, namely, in The Big Typescript there is, on the one hand, an operational conception of rule, and in the Blue Book, on the other, there is a relational conception. Given that, we will argue that misleading analogies play a crucial role in the formulation and dissolution of philosophical problems due to the improper import of grammars involved. This occurs in The Big Typescript because of improper importation of different grammars and their respective systems of rule, and in the Blue Book because of the use established within an interlocutory situation.