Guerra justa e legítima defesa em Michael Walzer

Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: 2023
Autor(a) principal: Souza, Alexandre Soares
Orientador(a): Não Informado pela instituição
Banca de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
Idioma: por
Instituição de defesa: Não Informado pela instituição
Programa de Pós-Graduação: Não Informado pela instituição
Departamento: Não Informado pela instituição
País: Não Informado pela instituição
Palavras-chave em Português:
Paz
Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/73290
Resumo: This paper discusses the moral problem of war of “self-defense”, based on the analysis of the contemporary Just War theory by the political philosopher Michael Walzer (1935- ). The re-search is primarily based on the work Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (1977), Second Part (The Aggression Theory), in which the American philosopher formulates his moral theory about war, in view of the common language of the people about war, human rights and the role of tradition. How to think of a “self-defense” war in the context of Michael Walzer's theory of aggression? The notion of self-defense is linked to a discussion at the ethical-political level: Walzer considers as prudential the preventive act that aims to hide the aggressor, without this initiative being an example of a mere reflex, or an act motivated exclusively by the desire for retaliation. We argue that the self-defense war must represent an intention to protect the essential rights of the people and the desire for the restoration of a pos-sible peace. Recognition of the need to preserve fundamental rights and community values certainly admitted the existence of a stable and shared moral world, from which the minimum philosophical argument, which problematizes the phenomenon of war, reaches the conclusion that it is not necessarily immoral under all circumstances. This way of theorizing war distances itself from rival theories, which nullify the possibility of ethics in the practice of war. And, objectively, it also distances itself from more consequentialist theories, because it emphasizes individual rights. The work ends by arguing about the need for a culture of peace for the future, critically rethinking the idea of just war, even restricted to the war of self-defense. This rethink-ing must take into account the impasses of the current political organization of international society, which still encourage practices of injustice and hinder the utopia of a solid proposal for peace, in which the notion of war would be abolished.