Existência, nomes próprios e lógica livre

• Ano de defesa: 2021
• Autor(a) principal: Gomes, Francisco Rafael da Silva
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Existência; Predicação; Nomes próprios; Lógica livre; Existence; Predication; Proper names; Freelogic
• Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/56423

In this work, I investigate the problem of existential sentences involving proper names. The main question is: “What is the role of the term ‘exist’ in singular existential predications?” There are two types of singular existential sentences: affirmative (aexists) and negative sentences (adoes not exist). True affirmative sentences yield tautologies; true negative sentences yield inconsistencies. In order to scrutinize these issues, this work exhibits three parts. Firstly, I discuss the classic debate on singular predications regarding the works of Alexius Meinong and Bertrand Russell. The Ontological Commitment criterion provided for Quine is also investigated. Secondly, three perspectives are scrutinized—Kripke, Salmon and Branquinho. They defend that “existence” is a first order predication. Lastly, I present Hintikka’s free logic. His system provides an account for the occurrence of empty names in a formal logic. I use Hintikka’s proposal for defending that existence is a first order predicate. Regarding existential sentences, I develop a proposal for empty names in ordinary language. My approach is based on the ideas from Hintikka and Salmon.