Lobbying corporativo em empresas listadas na nyse

• Ano de defesa: 2018
• Autor(a) principal: Maia, Ana Jeniffer Rebouças
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Palavras-chave em Português: Lobbying corporativo; Desempenho empresarial; Teoria economica
• Link de acesso: http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/38626

In this study, the corporate lobbying is analyzed under the basis of Economic Theory of Regulation and of the Agency Theory. Empirical evidence reveals that lobbying is a determinant of firm attributes, such as the Business performance and CEO (Chief Executive Officer) remuneration (ASLAN, GRISNTEIN, 2012, CHEN, PARSLEY, YANG, 2015, DING et al., 2014; NIESSEN; RUEZIN, 2010) and that different characteristics of the companies affect their political strategies, among them corporate lobbying ( MATHUR, SINGH, 2011; WEYMOUTH, 2012). Thus, the study has the objective of investigate the relationship between corporate lobbying, business performance and the CEO Remuneration of listed companies on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This is descriptive research, of a quantitative nature, using a documentary procedure, with the application of the statistical tools Correspondence Analysis (Anacor) and Multiple Linear Regression Analysis with panel data, for the treatment of data involving the period from 2013 to 2017 with a sample of 242 companies listed on the NYSE. The results didn’t suggest the association of corporate lobbying with the industry, the age of the organization, the size and indebtedness of the firm. Thus, it is not allowed to accept the hypothesis that corporate lobbying is associated with the organizational characteristics under analysis. The results show which the corporate lobbying negatively influenced the business performance measured by the IBEI (Return Before Extraordinary Items) and that there is no significant lobbying influence on performance represented by the ROE (Return on Equity) and by the TSR (Total Shareholder Return). Thus, in view of these results, it is possible to reject the second hypothesis proposed in the study, that corporate lobbying is positively related to corporate performance. It was observed that lobbying positively influences the CEO's compensation, thus allowing to accept the hypothesis of corporate lobbying is positively related to the CEO's compensation. The findings also suggest that the lobbying is not associated with wealth creation for shareholders in terms of increased organizational performance. Instead, finding a meaningful and positive relationship between lobbying and CEO compensation, suggesting lobbying benefits for top management of the company and not for its shareholders, confirming the Agency Theory's prognoses.