Detalhes bibliográficos
Ano de defesa: |
2012 |
Autor(a) principal: |
Campos, Francisco de Assis Oliveira Campos |
Orientador(a): |
Não Informado pela instituição |
Banca de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição |
Tipo de documento: |
Tese
|
Tipo de acesso: |
Acesso aberto |
Idioma: |
por |
Instituição de defesa: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
|
Palavras-chave em Português: |
|
Link de acesso: |
http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/4948
|
Resumo: |
This thesis consists of three essays in the area of economics of corruption, the first of which shows the main economics approaches directed to the phenomenon of corruption, particularly regarding the cause-effect relationship, addressing the most referenced researchs on the economics of corruption. The second essay estimates through an econometric model, the impact of a set of variables on the probability of a given Brazilian municipalitie to be classified as high tendency to corruption or low tendency to corruption, from the irregularities identified in supervision reports of the Controladoria-Geral da União - CGU, which were used to specify the dependent variable of the logit model. The results showed that the municipalities that have high tendency to corruption are those that receive a lot of resource transfers with respect to their budget, they also have poor-performanced social control and low-leveled municipal development, they are not sparsely populated and they have as neighbours municipalities with corruption problems. Finally, the third essay examines corruption from a general equilibrium model calibrated to Brazil, focusing on macroeconomic aggregates, in particular output and investment, and welfare for the aggregate economy. Also examined is the possibility of tradeoffs between corruption and inefficiency. The results of the conducted counterfactual exercises show that when there is a rise in corruption, investment and product are reduced in the longterm. As for welfare, a reduction or elimination of inefficiency results in a welfare increase, except for the case where the exercise verified the effects on inefficiency and corruption elimination in government consumption component, which resulted in a welfare reduction. On the other hand, whenever the increase of inefficiency was simulated, the result was a welfare decrease. Finally, regarding the possible tradeoff, the results found in the simulations indicated a reduction of output in the long-term, although the welfare increases. |