As estruturas estritamente coordenadas do sistema agroindustrial de carne suína da região Oeste do Paraná

• Ano de defesa: 2012
• Autor(a) principal: Borges, William José
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Tipo de acesso: Acesso aberto
• Idioma: por
• Instituição de defesa: Universidade Estadual de Maringá; Brasil; Departamento de Administração; Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração; UEM; Maringá, PR; Centro de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
• Palavras-chave em Português: Carne suína; Estrutura estritamente coordenada; Setor suinícola; Mercado; Custos de transação; Região Oeste do Paraná; Paraná; (Estado); Brasil.; Strictly coordinated system; Pork industry; The market; Transaction costs; State; Brazil.; Ciências Sociais Aplicadas; Administração
• Link de acesso: http://repositorio.uem.br:8080/jspui/handle/1/3222

This work seeks to discuss the approach of strictly coordinated system, theoretical framework developed by Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999) as an expanded perspective of the firm, taking into consideration the present transactions in pork production from western of Paraná. These transactions were viewed as an extension of the nexus of contracts proposed by Coase (1937) and taken up by Williamson (1985), but inserted in a market context. Thus, in order to understand how the producers may have asymmetric performance compared to other agents, the work has consolidated with the complement of two theories, the IO and the TCE, approaching, respectively, the market and the firm. For this purpose, was performed a descriptive qualitative research, with a transversal cut but with a longitudinal perspective. The primary data collection was realized through semi-structured interviews with rural producers integrated for more than five years. And the secondary data were collected through associations, departments of agriculture, research institutes and public organizations that contain information about the pig industry from Paraná. With respect to the subsystem that is inserted, it was found that the structure turns to identify points of common interests that encourage the producer to promote contracts on a strictly coordinated, considering the degree of specificity of assets involved in the transaction and, on the other hand, competitive forces that determine the search for adaptations to improve the production. Thus, all transaction attributes signaled by Williamson (1985) in the same way as the behavioral assumptions identified in the work and signaled the existence of asymmetries due to the disparity of the item efficiency. It was also considered the characterization of the market that proved to be very concentrated in a few integrated units, minimizing the possibilities of the producer to choose an organization to integrate. In addition, it was identified the constant presence of producers who invest in their production of pork, but that does not stop investing in other activities as well. From this scenario the elements identified from the IO and TCE based the position that the asymmetry of performance should be understood by considering the market conditions which participates in and submits the transaction at the time ex-post. Thus, the explanation of performance not provides only the structure of pork production, but also the diversification strategies that each producer follows, justifying its conduct active as investor to secure their growth. As sometimes the producer can't invest in its production, due to the release of the integrator, the pork's production isn't presented as the only activity responsible for inducing their growth, compared to other producers, but his conduct in the agribusiness that complements the rents to mitigate risks with other cultures.