Intenção estratégica nas relações transacionais no sistema agroindustrial do leite
| Ano de defesa: | 2014 |
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| Autor(a) principal: | |
| Orientador(a): | |
| Banca de defesa: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
| Tipo de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Idioma: | por |
| Instituição de defesa: |
Universidade Estadual de Maringá
Brasil Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração UEM Maringá, PR Centro de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas |
| Programa de Pós-Graduação: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Departamento: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| País: |
Não Informado pela instituição
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| Palavras-chave em Português: | |
| Link de acesso: | http://repositorio.uem.br:8080/jspui/handle/1/3293 |
Resumo: | Paraná State, is currently, the third largest milk producer in Brazil. This activity is responsible for the income generation for more than 100,000 producers. With that, the SAG of Paraná milkman becomes strategic in the economic situation of the State. Based on such context, the present dissertation aimed at to understand how the strategic intent exerts influence in the governance structure for transactions between the agents of the producer and processor segments in dairy agribusiness system in Paraná. Thus, this study was guided by the theoretical perspective of New Institutional Economics, by Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) and Measurement Costs Theory (TCM), Industrial Organization (IO) in the strand of Conduct, as well as conceptual assumptions related to Strategic Intent. Fieldwork conduction involved the dairy agribusiness system in Parana State, comprising producer and processor segments. Considering the intended purpose, it was performed a qualitative and descriptive research with a transversal-cut. The semi-structured interview was used as a tool for primary data collection and content analysis was used, from data aggregation into categories, as a way of interpreting the information obtained. As a result, governances via informal agreements, contracts and integration were identified, and the first was the structure of governance which prevails in transactions between segments. This is due to the confidence the producer places on the processor because of transactions recurrence. However, that structure does not line up with the transaction attributes, since there is high asset specificity, the presence of uncertainties, and the possibility of opportunistic behavior by both segments. Moreover, that structure does not line up, considering the measurable dimensions because informal agreements do not guarantee the protection of the legal and economic rights. Therefore, the structure which provides higher efficiency, given the approach of the TCM and TCE are the contracts. For the cases of vertical integration found, it was noticed that, when considering only the TCE, they can be justified given the asset specificity and uncertainty. As a result, the producers choose this structure, in order to protect their right of milk ownership. In relation to the agent's conduct, it was observed that there are several strategies targeting individual goals of both segments. It was also found that the agent's conduct may influence the governance structure of their transactions. Finally, considering the strategic intent, it was verified that its influence on the agent's conduct in the past was more intense because its ambition prevailed against the existing market situation at that time. Currently, it is observed that the agent considers the market situation in the process of defining strategies, however, this does not completely restrict the role of its intentions in this task. In conclusion, the strategic intent exerts influence in shaping the governance structure, adapting it in the most appropriate way to the agent's goals and ambitions. Even in contexts with high asset specificity and uncertainty, the agent makes its decisions by considering not only the protection against appropriations, but its pretensions and ambitions in the dairy business. |